Non-Traditional Security Dilemmas on the Belt and Road by Ferguson, R. James
Bond University
Research Repository
Non-Traditional Security Dilemmas on the Belt and Road
Ferguson, R. James
Published: 06/07/2019
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Ferguson, R. J. (2019). Non-Traditional Security Dilemmas on the Belt and Road. Paper presented at ISA Asia-
Pacific Conference 2019, Singapore, Singapore.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 12 Apr 2020
1 
 
 
 
Non-Traditional Security Dilemmas on the Belt and Road 
By Dr R. James Ferguson, 
Faculty of Society and Design, 
Bond University, 
Australia 
 
Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference of the International Studies 
Association (ISA) Narratives of Security in Asian Geopolitics, ,  
3-6th of July 2019, Singapore 
 
Abstract 
Abstract: Non-Traditional Security (NTS) cooperation has been seen as a ready focus for multilateral 
dialogue, soft-power enhancement and positive military diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. Some NTS 
threats have been responded to by embracing various approaches including ‘military operations other 
than war’ (MOOTW), as well as disaster relief and humanitarian interventions (HADR). These are also 
testing grounds for military capacity, indicating power projection and forward deployment abilities. 
NTS operational capacities can become part of a spiralling security dilemma that undercuts the 
claimed benefits for military diplomacy and cooperative security approaches. Growing Chinese and 
Japanese NTS-capacities and are now part of a wider Indo-Pacific dynamic along the Maritime Silk 
Road. China’s need to provide for non-traditional security along the Belt and Road includes the 
expanded use of private security companies, ‘paramilitary’ maritime deployments, and PLA units. NTS 
threats are now important components within Chinese defence and foreign policy, including the 
calibrated use of armed force. Non-traditional security dilemmas intensify during acquisition of ‘dual 
use’ assets, and when traditional security competition already exists, e.g. threat perceptions of 
Chinese military assertiveness. Carefully managed, the BRI represents an invitation for security 
cooperation. However, it also risks new forms of military competition and increasing securitization of 
developmental and environmental issues, a well-known problem for NTS as a conceptual and 
operational category. 
 
Introduction: Where Security Cooperation and Military Competition Meet 
Non-Traditional Security (NTS) cooperation has been seen as a ready focus for multilateral 
and multilevel dialogue, soft-power enhancement and positive military diplomacy in the 
Indo-Pacific region (Baldino & Carr 2016). NTS threats have been responded to militarily by 
embracing approaches such as ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW), disaster relief 
and humanitarian interventions (HADR), as well as post-disaster recovery and stabilisation 
operations. However, such operations are also a testing ground and showcases for military 
capacity, including intelligence and logistic operations that support power projection and 
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forward deployment abilities. They have been increasingly featured in Chinese, Japanese and 
Indian doctrines and operations over the last two decades, e.g. via anti-piracy operations, UN 
support operations, and international humanitarian and disaster-relief (HADR) deployments 
in relation to tsunamis, typhoons and earthquakes. This has been driven in part by the desire 
by such states to be seen as ‘net security providers’ rather than security threats (PRC 2013 & 
2015; MoD 2018b; Fan & Char 2019; Gill & Mitra 2018). They are also used as an avenue 
for low-risk bilateral and multilateral cooperation, thereby being used as confidence and trust 
building measures (Martel 2017; DoS 2014). In turn, observations of HADR and MOOTW 
operations also provide competing states with information on the strengths and weakness of 
the state engaging in these activities, a form of ‘secret reconnaissance’ which was of 
particular concern to China in its anti-piracy deployments from 2008 on (Lin-Greenberg 
2018). 
In general, NTS concerns go beyond the defence of the state to a wider assessment of risks to 
the population as a whole and their extra-territorial national interests (Ghiselli 2018). Such 
transnational security threats provide motives for great power cooperation, but also generate 
divergent, even clashing, views of how they should be resolved (Cui & Buzan 2016). Wider 
NTS challenges such as resource depletion and Climate Change have driven decades of 
diplomacy via the UN and UNFCCC, while transnational organized crime, illicit goods, and 
money laundering have increasingly engage global and regional organizations, e.g. via the 
UNODC, ASEAN, and related groups such the ADMM and ADMM-Plus (Martel 2017; 
UNODC 2019). Likewise, across the Indo-Pacific diverse groupings use HADR operations as 
a focus of, or means towards, maritime cooperation. It is a central component of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) agendas (Pennisi 
2016). It is a priority area for the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Action Plan for 
2017-2021 (being developed via the ‘Cluster Group’ on Disaster Risk Management), and 
engaged in the France-Australia-NZ maritime cooperation agreements (FRANZ). Disaster 
relief is also a component in numerous multilateral naval exercises such as the MILAN and 
KOMODO exercises. In so far as NTS issues are seen as ‘soft’ security issues they are often 
treated as ‘low-hanging fruit’ where cooperation can readily be used to build confidence and 
trust  (CTBMs) among the parties involved (Martel 2017). 
However, NTS operational capacities can also become part of a spiralling security dilemma 
that undercuts the claimed benefits for military diplomacy and cooperative security 
approaches (Lin-Greenberg 2018). Cycles of capacity-building have already been observed in 
Chinese and Japanese NTS operations, and are now part of a wider Indian-Ocean dynamic 
along the Maritime Silk Road. This can be seen in China’s participation in anti-piracy 
operations in the India Ocean and off the coast of Somalia, an early indication of its ability to 
maintain small naval tasks forces operating at a long distance from their bases, though their 
rules of engagement were rather limited and conservative (Ghiselli 2018). Though often 
relatively small (usually two combatants and a supply ship), China between 2008 and 2018 
sent a total of 30 task forces as part of wider anti-piracy operations, escorted over 5,900 ships 
in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden by 2017, and sent vessels to evacuate Chinese 
and other nations from Libya and Yemen (Fan & Char 2019; Hein 2017; see further below). 
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These operations are pretexted on humanitarian grounds, protecting SLOCs and cargo 
shipping, which now includes sizeable numbers of Chinese cargoes and its growing merchant 
marine. Though such operations do provide shared regional security and economic benefits, 
they can also be viewed as ‘impure public goods’ in that they differentially serve other ends 
such as power projection and enhanced diplomatic influence (Lin-Greenberg 2018).  
Moreover, these trends have created considerable concern from Indian and Australian 
observers, who see this as a wider pattern of maritime power-projection, especially when 
combined with threat perceptions based on the so-called ‘string-of-pearls’ and Maritime Silk 
Road investments which give PRC increased access to ports and fuelling points across the 
Indian Ocean (Connolly 2018; Ferguson 2018; Sakhuja 2014).  
Japan, too, has deployed limited maritime forces beyond East Asian into the wider Indo-
Pacific, though usually as part of multilateral or UN mandated operations. This included 
sending ships into the Persian Gulf for controversial mine-sweeping roles in 1991, with 
further supply missions into the Indian Ocean through 2001-2010 in support of US operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as support for regional coast guard training and other 
initiatives via its dialogue with ASEAN. This was an extension of Japan’s ‘normalization’ via 
cautious multilateral and humanitarian support roles, e.g. medical teams in Cambodia (1992-
1993), disaster and relief teams to Indonesia, Thailand, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
(2004-2005), reconstruction and engineering teams in Iraq and East Timor, as well as early 
disaster relief teams in western India (2001), Pakistan (2005) and New Zealand (2011), 
among others (MoD 2011; Hughes 2004 & 2009; UN-OCHA 2005). In the wider context of 
Japanese SDF modernization, this can be seen as a form of ‘proactive pacifism’ which allows 
for overseas operations that actively support global peace. Thereafter Japan gradually 
engaged an extended pattern of defence mobilization in relation to ‘grey areas’ ranging from 
anti-piracy operations through to air and naval deployments in the East China Sea, checking 
China’s claims to the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and adjacent EEZs (MoD 2018; Chipman et 
al. 2017; Kirsten 2016; IISS 2015; MoD 2016).  
In this content, Japan from 2011 has maintained a logistics base with a port and airfield in 
Djibouti, backed up by a small number of ground troops. Japan’s national defence guidelines 
for 2019 noted that beyond anti-piracy efforts, the SDF facility will help Japan cooperate in 
the long-term quest for ‘regional security’ (MoD 2018b). China opened their own logistics 
base in Djibouti in 2017, while the US, France, Germany, Italy and Spain also have bases in 
the county, with Saudi Arabia signing agreements for the possible future development of a 
facility (Melvin 2019). In some measure, these early Japanese and Chinese efforts could be 
seen as mutual shadowing and matching of extended deployment capacities, at least in the 
Indian Ocean, followed by a more direct form of strategic confrontation in the East China Sea 
(Layton 2019; Hughes 2009 & 2004; see further below).  
NTS is not an uncontested category. Indeed, it is defined by what it is not, i.e. it is not 
traditional security, with its focus on interstate conflict, direct national defense, or waging 
conventional wars (Martel 2017). A long list of ‘other’ issues then get dropped into this NTS 
category, especially if they are transnational in character, originate from non-military 
actors/factors, and are not easily dealt with by the direct application of military force, e.g. 
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climate change risks, environmental and natural disasters, flows of illicit goods, non-
documented migration, transnational criminal networks, food and water security (Martel 
2017). Debates have continued since the 1990s (following on from the Copenhagen School’s 
work) on how these issues have been framed by national narratives and social discourses 
prioritise specific non-military challenges as ‘threats’ (Albert & Buzan 2011). Likewise, such 
securitizations may mask competing rather than cooperative extensions of governance 
beyond state borders, using ‘risk’ to mobilize domestic and regional responses (Hameiri & 
Jones 2019; Su 2015).  
Resource scarcity is an area where these mechanisms can be easily seen, e.g. the extension of 
concern over fisheries depletion in South East Asia has moved from national monitoring of 
EEZs towards a wider conceptualization of fisheries management across the South China Sea 
and the Coral Triangle. This can be seen as a legitimate extension of scientific approaches, 
allowing a shift toward sustainable use of shared fisheries, especially for off-shore fish 
species that move across EEZs and open sea boundaries (Teh 2017 et al.). If successful, this 
approach could act as one CTBM to expand trust among regional states, a methodology 
explored via groups such as ASEAN, the ARF and CSCAP. However, such trends could also 
intensify territorial claims via securitized monitoring of transnational fisheries under national 
rubrics and threat perceptions, e.g. as found in Indonesia, Vietnamese and Chinese responses 
to ‘illegal’ fishing in recent years (see CSCAP 2017; Parameswaran 2017; Supriyanto 2016; 
for caution on inflated ‘threat perceptions’ of Chinese fishing catches, see Austin 2019). 
Further, adopting an NTS agenda will not always lead to automatic cooperation in dealing 
with harder traditional security issues pretexted on issues of sovereignty and territorial 
control. This can be seen in ASEAN contexts, where NTS responses have been a way of 
enhancing regional security cooperation, but have only slowly moved from CTBMs towards 
preventive diplomacy, with little ability to address China’s territorial claims or reduce 
tensions between the US and China (Martely 2017). In this context, ASEAN has made 
serious progress in regional coordination for disaster risks governance since the ASEAN 
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) in 2008 and the 
creation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA). However, 
other NTS responses are more problematic, e.g. the problems of SE Asian air pollution (the 
Haze) driven by forest fires in Indonesia have induced serious attention from ASEAN 
mechanisms
1
 since 1997, but the process remains controversial and incomplete (Kamolvej 
2019). 
Japanese and Chinese Non-Traditional Security agendas are often used as part of wider soft-
power responses designed to enhance national prestige and expand international influence in 
the Indo-Pacific. In turn, this may help legitimate Chinese interests and presence along the 
Maritime Silk Road (MSR), as well providing one platform for focused Japanese activism in 
the Indo-Pacific under the so-called ‘Abe Doctrine’ (Envall 2018). Indeed, Chinese responses 
to NTS threats can be seen as a corollary of its expanding global interests along BRI 
                                                          
1
 These include the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) and the ASEAN Haze 
Monitoring System (HMS) from 2013. 
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corridors. In the Indo-Pacific the expansion of Chinese interests, presence and comprehensive 
capacities has led to tensions with other states (especially Japan and India), as well as concern 
expressed in regional organisations such as ASEAN, IONS and IORA (China is a dialogue 
partner to IORA and became an observer to IONS from 2015). There is no simple remedy for 
these trends during a period of geopolitical tensions, driven mainly by clashing US, Chinese, 
Indian and Japanese strategic preoccupations. However, a strong commitment to transparent, 
‘permissive’ operations directed towards shared and agreed problems may reduce trends 
toward competitive power projection as a form of strategic pre-emption (see further below). 
The next section of the paper will explore NTS operations in the context of Japanese and 
Chinese soft power agendas. This will be followed by a brief analysis of Chinese responses to 
NTS Threats as part of its expanding global interests, channelled through its expanding Belt 
and the Road Initiatives. The BRI opens up geo-economic corridors where China’s security 
concerns are intensified, even if these do not directly engage the PLA itself. China still 
mainly relies on local armed forces to protect its investments, backed up in part by small 
amounts of military aid and a limited number of naval and more regular SCO exercises 
(Ghiasy & Zhou 2017).  However, there are now increased pressures to acquire the ‘capacity 
to respond’, whether through upgraded military capacities, expanded coast guards, special 
police units, militias, or private security corporations (PSCs). The final section will explore 
partial remedies to these problems. They rest on two approaches: where joint military 
capabilities are required they should function through UN, regional or multilateral 
institutions, and where force is not required, there should be a rapid shift towards de-
militarization, with civilian agencies taking up governance roles. When worked in 
conjunction, these two approaches can reduce the likelihood of NTS security dilemmas being 
sustained, thereby undercutting the negative construction of shared NTS problems as inter-
state threats.  
Japanese and Chinese NTS Responses as Soft Power Enhancers 
Both Japan and China can be seen as using NTS responses, humanitarian uses of military 
capacities, emergency aid, and developmental funding in support of national soft power, 
encouraging positive and friendly responses by partner nations and reducing past and present 
threat perceptions (for definitions of soft and smart power, see Nye 2004a; 2004b; 2008; 
2009, 2013). Although, soft power gains need not be seen as a part of a zero sum game, 
competitive approaches to soft power are more likely when there are unresolved territorial 
disputes and where security dilemmas have been complicated by military modernisation or 
existing power differentials. This is the case with the expansion of China’s military capacities 
and the rise of its comprehensive national power, now projected more widely onto the Indo-
Pacific stage via the security footprint of the Belt and Road Initiative (Ferguson & Dellios 
2017; Ferguson 2018; see further below). This has been intensified by direct military 
competition by the PRC with the US and India in their respective spheres of influence in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as concerns over the geopolitical impact of the evolving 
Belt and Road Initiative. 
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Over the last three decades, Japanese foreign policy and security trends had emerged into a 
wider pattern of multilateral cooperation that can be summarized as ‘soft power through 
development’. This was an extension of Japan’s 21st century focus on economic influence and 
civilian power, combined with limited but robust Self-Defence capacities. This was updated 
in its Revised Aid Cooperation concept (February 2015) of ‘good’ development as the best 
proactive contribution to peace, utilizing soft power, aid, and trade along with some hard 
power capacities (MOFA 2015a). This approached combined shared ‘universal’ values and 
actively promoting international peace and stability at the regional and global levels. 
Although linked to the rubric of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ from 2016, this was far less 
assertive that the US interpretation of this concept (Rossiter 2018), but instead focused on 
cooperative mechanisms with many partners. Its governance focus enhanced Strategic 
Development Cooperation for economic growth, promoted Human Security and sought to 
build ‘strategic partnerships’ with small or island states with ‘particular’ vulnerabilities, 
operating across 18 sub-areas (MOFA 2015a). 
This agenda included strong commitments on Disaster Relief and Climate Change, whereby 
Japan would provide assistance in disaster risk reduction and environmental/climate change 
management for small island developing states (SIDS).  This links to Japan’s ongoing role as 
a major developmental aid donor, circa fourth in the world overall in 2017 with increases of 
around 3% for ODA in 2019 over 2018 (Donor Tracker 2019; MOFA 2015a; Japan Times 
2015; JICA 2016). Overall around $10 billion annually has been channeled into aid flows 
with a focus on poverty reduction and infrastructure development. Japan is also a major 
supporter of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as both a founding member and major 
shareholder in that organization.  
Beyond financial aid, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (revised in 2004) and 
its updated Development Cooperation Charter (from 2015) support JSDF non-combat roles 
for disaster relief and coast guard operations, as well as cooperation with ASEAN on naval 
patrols and protection of sea lanes (MOFA 2015a; Kyodo 2016; Kyodo 2014). It was 
recognized that there was a clear link between security and the ability to sustain socio-
economic development:  
In natural disasters and other emergencies, Japan will provide prompt assistance taking into 
account longer-term recovery and reconstruction. In view of the fact that threats to stability 
and security can hamper socio-economic development, Japan will also provide assistance to 
enhance capacities in developing countries such as: the capacity of law enforcement 
authorities including capabilities to ensure maritime safety; the capacity of security authorities 
including capabilities to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime including drug 
trafficking and trafficking in persons; and the capacity of developing countries in relation to 
global commons such as seas, outer space, and cyberspace. (MOFA 2015b) 
Japan has long been active in global human security and sustainable development networks, 
with these agenda now part of soft power positioned within idea of ‘Proactive Pacificism’, 
i.e. the idea of making a sustainable ‘pro-active contribution to peace.’ Development is thus 
seen as way to aid global security, e.g. as means to reduce transnational terrorism as well 
improve environmental and health security. This aid is not just focused on Asia. Japan has 
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pledged circa $30 billion (private and public) to help stabilize key zones across Africa 
through 2013-2019, allowing improved resource access and but also part of ‘soft’ 
competition with the PRC (Sun 2016). This was based in part on the Yokohama Action Plan 
of 2013-2017, with targeted agriculture and health programs to Kenya, Morocco, Malawi, 
Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and elsewhere (JICA 2018; MOFA 2015). Japan has developed a 
regional plan for development within Africa, with sub-regional plans with a human security 
focus evolving since 2015 (MOFA 2015). More recently, Japan has partnered with India in an 
‘Asia Africa Growth Corridor’, seen by some as an unofficial counter to China’s BRI 
operations in Africa and the Indian Ocean (Brinza 2018; Beri 2017; Puri et al. 2017). 
Of course, Japan’s recent policies go beyond soft power and NTS responses into a more 
robust posture via the so-called ‘Abe Doctrine’ and the use of the concepts of ‘Dynamic 
Deterrence’ and ‘Grey Zone’ engagements. Dynamic deterrence allows for counter-strike 
based on a more integrated air warning and defense control system within Japan, and well as 
some further southward position of SFD assets. Beyond this, it allows some deployments of 
Japanese forces overseas and permits overseas combat in defense of a friendly country or 
forces being attacked (Ramirez 2017; MacIntyre 2012). Grey zones can be “defined as a 
broad range of contingencies that fall between peace and war – for example, disputes over 
territory, sovereignty or economic interests. Grey-zone contingencies typically involve a 
government decision to show a military presence or to attempt to change the status quo using 
physical means.” (IISS 2015) This situation can be applied to the tensions over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, where deployments of naval and air patrols occur on a regular basis, 
signalling rising military tensions between Japan and China  even if neither intends to 
escalate this situation into a direct military clash. With overlapping air defence identification 
zones and important resources such as the Chunxiao gas field at stake, it is not surprising that 
both countries sought to stake a strong presence. From 2010 to 2015 the number of 
‘scrambles’ by Japanese SDF against Chinese aircraft rose rapidly (MoD 2014 & 2016). By 
2016 total Japanese interceptor scrambles peaked at 1,168, while in 2018 Japanese aircraft 
scrambled 999 times in response to Chinese and Russian aircraft, indicating a situation that 
was not war but certainly not peace either (Burke & Ichihashi 2019; MoD 2018).  Bearing in 
mind that overall Japan is ranked around 9-10
th
 globally in its diverse military capabilities, 
this is a serious deployment of hard power that needs to be assessed in the strategic balance 
of the Indo-Pacific. (Ramirez 2017; MacIntyre 2012). 
Overall, gradual revisions of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has 
allowed Japan a more active role across Indo-Pacific region, including potential deployment 
of naval missile defence systems, advanced attack submarines, use of military satellites (after 
adoption of the Basic Space Law from 2008), enhanced cyber security, and stronger maritime 
cooperation with Indonesia and India (Chipman et al. 2018; MOD 2018; Matsuoka 2016; 
Ramirez 2017; IISS 2015; Robertson 2011). However, it seems unlikely that PM Abe will be 
able to actually revise the text (versus the interpretation) of Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution by 2020. This would need two-thirds support in parliament, a referendum, and 
stronger political support publicly: as of 2017 46% of survey Japanese were against this, and 
through 2018-2019 there was limited support from coalition partners and NGOs for these 
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revised policies (Tatsumi 2019; Lewis 2017; Matsuoka 2016). Here there is some trade-off 
between soft power and more assertive strategies. Even though Japan can be seen as gaining 
soft power globally, rising from 7
th
 in global ranks in 2016 to around 5
th
 in 2018 in the 
Portland Soft Power surveys, this was still limited by negative perceptions in China and 
South Korea, with Abe’s doctrine eroding soft power influence due to displays of military 
capability (McClory 2018; McClory 2016). Japan’s rating with the Soft Power 30 is largely 
based on cultural and technical factors, combined with extensive diplomatic, development 
and aid programs, plus regional leadership on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (now relabelled 
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or CPTPP) after 
the US withdrew from the TPP (McClory 2018).  
China, too, has long been aware of the growing reality of non-traditional security threats and 
more recently has been willing to enter into international agreements to help collectively 
manage them (Ferguson 2018a). Drug control, for example, has been a long-term focus of 
modern China, which saw itself as a victim of ruthless exploitation of the opium trade from 
the 19
th
 century onward, with continued 21
st
 century flows from Myanmar and Afghanistan 
as current challenges (UNODC 2019; Su 2017; for alternative narratives of the Opium Wars 
of the 19
th
 century, see Platt 2018; Wang 2012). These concerns have continued to shape 
PRC’s NTS relations with Southeast Asia. China entered into cooperative mechanisms to 
cope with transnational organized crime (from 2000) and signed the Joint Declaration on 
Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues with ASEAN in 2002, 
recognizing that a wide range of trans-border issues needed pan-Asian cooperation, especially 
with neighbouring states and groupings such as ASEAN, the ARF and the SCO (Cui 2013; 
Su 2015;Wong 2007; Ghiselli 2018; ASEAN 2002).  
This has been folded into a combined military and diplomacy approach as part of China’s 
emerging ‘new security concept’ from 2002 onward: 
The complex relationship between non-traditional security and China’s national security and 
foreign policy is reflected in Jiang Zeming’s words during the 16th National Congress of the 
CCP in 2002. He stressed that traditional and non-traditional security threats, especially 
terrorism, are interwoven and are having disruptive effects over the stable international 
environment that China needs for its own development. Consequently, the solution was to 
make the NSC operational through multilateral dialogues, such as the UN and other 
international organizations. . . . In summary, non-traditional security issues were not seen as 
threats to China’s existence, but to the external environment it needed to develop. 
Consistently, the response advocated by the Chinese leaders is diplomatic in nature even if it 
has a limited military component. These were the very early stages of the securitization 
process. (Ghiselli 2018, p. 614).  
 
Subsequently, NTS issues and protecting Chinese interests abroad have been given growing 
prominence in China’s defence white papers, and since 2006 lead to a strong emphasis on 
‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW) as a crucial part of PLA missions, training, 
logistics, and research, including expanded peace keeping operations (State Council 
Information Office 2013 & 2015; Ghiselli 2018).  It is important not to read this trend as 
‘military operations short of war’ along a spectrum using difference levels of force, but rather 
as a spectrum of diplomatic engagement that ranges from peace-keeping through to public 
dissemination of information. This can be broadly described as the public diplomacy of China 
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combined with the ‘political work’ within the PLA and other state agencies (Fan & Char 
2019). The PLA began to evolve conceptual, doctrinal, educational and operation bases for 
the response to both domestic and international emergencies, developed first with the 
Academy of Military Science (AMS), the National Defense University (NDU), the Army 
Command College (ACC) and other PLA teaching centres, and within the Emergency Office 
of General Staff Development (GSD) (Fan & Char 2019). In parallel, the PLA and police 
units became more involved in ‘on-call peace arrangements’ with the UN, eventually having 
deployed over 30,000 personnel into 24 UN missions through 1997-2018, as well as creating 
a Peacekeeping Centre in the Ministry of National Defense (Fan & Char 2019). From late 
2017 China registered 8,000 troops for the peacekeeping standby force of the UN, with 800 
being made available for rapid deployment via the UN ‘Vanguard Brigade’ (ISDP 2018).  
Diverse conceptualizations of MOOTW operations include different aspects of “deterrence, 
counter-terrorism, riot suppression, mass event management, border blockade, disaster rescue 
and relief, nuclear, biological and chemical rescue and relief, air and sea security, air and sea 
control, protection of maritime strategic communication lines, international peacekeeping, 
and overseas rescue and relief.” (Fan & Char 2019, p4.) It is important to note what is 
excluded from MOOTW operations as well. The US military discontinued the term in 2006, 
but originally had 18 types of operations, including items not found in Chinese thinking such 
as “arms control and disarmament, enforcement of sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones, 
support for insurgencies, counter-insurgency, strikes and raids.” (Fan & Char 2019, p9). 
Overall, China’s MOOTW principles are closely aligned to the non-interventionist stance of 
PRC’s foreign policy principles, with restrictions on intervention, enforcement, or targeted 
strikes against other countries. However, as Chinese interests via trade and geopolitical 
competition have moved from a regional to a global agenda, China’s security policies have 
had to move well beyond the framework of territorial defence and sovereignty claims. Rather, 
PLA’s ‘new’ mandated missions have a wide brief in protecting Chinese and Chinese 
interests on the global stage, even if this largely pursued preferably by cooperative rather than 
by coercive means. (Ferguson & Dellios 2017). Although formally aligned with UN goals, 
such operations have a primary focus on China’s expanding economic and geopolitical 
interests (ISDP 2018). 
These humanitarian operations have earned China some credibility as an international actor 
able to respond to emergencies overseas. Thus China has been engaged in seeking the 
protection or withdrawal of Chinese during crises (natural and political) in the Solomon 
Islands, East Timor, Tonga, Lebanon, Chad, Thailand, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Darfur, the 
Gulf of Aden, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya (where over 36,000 Chinese citizens evacuated), 
Yemen, Japan and Mali (Ghiselli 2018; Connolly 2018). At first these were small, non-
military operations but from 2011 on began to include PLA support and PLAN ships, 
especially for major crises (Connolly 2018). These numbers reflect the growing number of 
Chinese people going overseas, including government officials, business persons, contractors, 
tourists, students, engineers, workers and potentially even farmers (as part of China’s food 
security agenda, Hofman 2016). China has about 30-40,000 businesses operating globally, 
and above 100 million Chinese travel abroad annually, sometimes to fragile or conflict-prone 
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states (Heath 2018; Ferguson 2018). This provides a direct and serious rational for China’s 
widening engagement in regional and global security processes. It has prompted the creation 
of a Department of External Security and a Small Group for Coordination on External 
Emergencies, as well as created the demand for increased risk assessment capacities (Ghiselli 
2018). This expanded circle of interests and capabilities have become embedded in the 
‘holistic national security’ (HNS) concept that was endorsed by Xi Jinping and the Central 
National Security Commission from 2015 on (Ghiselli 2018).   
Support for MOOTW, sea-lane security, anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations were the 
rationales for the creation of a logistic support base and supply port at Djibouti in 2015. It 
was also used to justify the building of infrastructure (including airstips) on some of the 
islands in the South China Sea, and for future improved access to Gwadar, nearby Jiwani, 
Bagamoyo (Tanzania) and other ports across the Indo-Pacific (Brewster 2018). Likewise, 
Chinese been involved in responding to international emergencies and disasters, e.g. in 
October 2005, the China International Search and Rescue Team arrived at earthquake struck 
Balakot area in Nepal, bring with them a team of 49 earthquake experts, PLA engineers, and 
PAP (People’s Armed Police) medical workers (Fan & Char 2019). In 2014 medical teams 
were sent to Haiti and to several West African countries fighting Ebola (Renwick 2017). 
Since 2013 China has been involved in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations 
in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, having sent international rescue teams, medical 
teams and DNA testing group to the tsunami-hit countries, including deployment of its Peace 
Ark hospital ship. From March 2014 China also deployed almost 20 PLAN and Coast Guard 
ships as well as air assets to search missing Malaysian Airline Flight 370, working with some 
26 countries including India (Lin-Greenberg 2018). 
China itself has historically been subject to major natural disasters, including floods and 
earthquakes that affect densely populated areas, leading to major reforms of its disaster risk 
reduction strategies (DDR) since 2008, and a willingness to cooperation internationally with 
the Sendai Framework (for Disaster Risk Reduction). China also has ongoing Trilateral 
dialogues with Japan and South Korea on these and related environmental issues (the 
Tripartite Environmental Ministers Meeting, TEMM, operating from 1999 on), plus 
agreements with ASEAN on disaster management cooperation (from 2014), plus limted 
‘small-team’ medical cooperation with the US from 2013 (Renwick 2017; Cui 2013).  
The soft power benefits and public diplomacy aspects of HADR responses are well 
understood by PRC: 
It is common for MOOTW to come under public scrutiny. Positive media coverage about PLA 
MOOTW, thus, not only boosts morale but also inspires personnel to carry out their tasks 
well. Prompt dissemination and exchange of information is recommended to enhance troops’ 
capacity; while timely news conferences are encouraged to promote situational awareness 
among the public, with comprehensive media coverage also employed to showcase PLA work 
style. (Fan & Char 2019, p8). 
Overall, China increased engagement in UN operations has been seen as supporting ‘system 
stability’ in a world its describes as fraught by risk, hot spots, and increasing tension with the 
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United States (PRC 2017 & 2015). At the same it has rejected efforts to restrict its access and 
use of the East and South China seas, responded to criticism of its Belt and Road Initiative by 
seeking to address excessive debt, energy and environmental issues that concern states such 
as Australia, India and China (the ‘green development’ agenda and BRI 2.0, see Schmitt 
2019; Dong et al 2017). Another controversial area will be how far China needs to mobilize 
extra forms of security for its BRI’s economic corridors. 
The Expanding Security Needs of the Belt and Road 
China’s increased need to provide for non-traditional security along the Belt and Road 
includes the expanded use of private security companies, ‘paramilitary’ maritime 
deployments of coastguard and other marine units, and the PLA’s mandated ‘new missions’ 
to protect Chinese interests and citizens beyond national borders. Indeed, PRC is 
transforming operations towards a stronger and comprehensive maritime focus: 
Today, modern China is at the turning point of becoming a truly maritime-capable nation in 
terms of the emerging capacities of the PLA Navy (PLAN), its development as a leading 
shipbuilder, its growing merchant marine, its interest in seabed mining for resources, and its 
huge fishing fleet (the world’s largest for distance fishing). China is developing a 
comprehensive approach to its evolving maritime strategy, including a focus on oceanic 
resource management as well as security and legal issues. Several agencies other than 
PLAN are involved in this process including the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), the 
Coast Guard of the Border Control Department, the China Maritime Police, the China Marine 
Surveillance (CMS), Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), and Maritime Anti-
smuggling Bureau (Ferguson & Dellios 2017, pp107-108) 
Overall, China is increasingly engaged in the West and South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and 
most recently the Arctic, now added as an ‘Ice Road’ to the BRI (Liu 2018; PRC 2018a). 
Along the diverse corridors of the BRI, NTS threats and their management are now important 
components within Chinese defense and foreign policy. Such operations have allowed China 
to build up its operational capacity to support peace keeping and other roles in Africa and the 
Indian Ocean. In operations in Africa (including South Sudan, Mali and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo), China has sent not only engineers and medical teams but well-armed 
and trained soldiers, with these units being given similar training to PLA special forces 
(Ghiselli 2018). These factors have led to an increasingly securitized approach that embraces 
the calibrated use of force combined with a civil-military responsiveness: 
The fact that the PLA became the main protagonist of this process after an initial civilian 
response, from showing the flag in support of China’s international standing, to more concrete 
actions to defend the country’s interests and citizens abroad, shows how powerful the 
process of securitization has been. Ultimately, this process not only led to growing military 
activities abroad and the creation of the relevant institutional–legal framework, but it also 
caused a broader reconsideration about the use of force in foreign policy. (Ghiselli 2018, 
p624) 
 
These trends have been observed with concern by the US, India, Australia and Japan. Non-
traditional security dilemmas are likely to intensify over acquisition of ‘dual use’ assets, e.g. 
landing-craft, helicopters, helicopter-carriers, heavy-lift transport aircraft, mobile hospitals, 
expanded intelligence gathering via new satellites, and in future the social monitoring via 
digital data and AIs (Lin-Greenberg 2018; Nagy 2019; Lee 2018). Such dilemmas are most 
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intense when traditional security competition already exists, e.g. threat perceptions of 
Chinese military modernisation, expanded fields of operation in the Indian Ocean and parts of 
Africa, as well as an assertiveness in relation to Japanese and US challenges (Lin-Greenberg 
2018). Access to its logistic base at Djibouti and port-fuelling agreements elsewhere in the 
Indian Ocean have long been seen as presaging a wider power projection capacity as the PLA 
Navy modernizes, or even as the ground work of a future network of dual-use bases (for such 
speculations, usually denied by host countries, see Brewster 2018).  
Massive investment into the Maritime Silk Road and the BRI, initially over $1.3 billion to be 
committed by various Chinese and multilateral banks such as the AIIA, demonstrates an 
increase in Chinese economic interests and activity across Eurasia, Southeast Asia, the South 
Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. These projects often cross, or are adjacent, to areas of recent or 
present instability, e.g. The New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor passes just north 
of Afghanistan and needs improved security in nearby Tajikistan, while the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor engages infrastructure projects in areas disputed by India and Pakistan, as 
well as crossing through troubled Balochistan in West Pakistan. China has some fifty BRI 
and AIIB projects underway in the Middle East, including a comprehensive strategic 
partnership with Egypt and a strong presence in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, and may 
consider further reconstruction aid and investment in Syria beyond the $2 billion already 
pledged if the situation there stabilizes (Hemenway 2018; Ehteshami & Horesh 2017; Al-
Tamimi 2017). 
Although China mainly relies on host countries’ military and policing capabilities, it has also 
expanded the role of private security companies (PSCs), which are still to develop the legal 
structure to allow for Chinese to operate in armed private secuirty roles overseas (Legarda & 
Nouwens 2018; Kai 2016a; Arduino 2016b). In 2014 Chinese firms probably spent up to $8 
billion on overseas security, while from 2017 several security providers, including the 
Chinese Overseas Security Group, China Security and Protection Group, Control Risks, 
Beijing Dewe Security Services, Hua Xin Zhong An and the Frontier Services group operated 
along parts of the BRI, usually working with local companies and training staff (Legarda & 
Nouwens 2018; Ferguson 2018; Reuters 2017c; Liu 2015). These groups have been involved 
in evacuations of Chinese workers (from Samarra, Iraq, 2014, from Juba, South Sudan, 
2016), and even train for hostage rescue situations. However, there are certain risks in these 
trends: 
Despite their nominally private status, Chinese private security companies tend to operate with the 
tacit support and encouragement of the Chinese government and are often staffed by former PLA 
officers with close, if indirect, ties to the Chinese authorities. This makes them complex, quasi-
governmental international actors whose behavior is unregulated, since existing legal frameworks 
– both at the domestic and international level – do not clearly specify who is responsible for 
policing their operations. (Learda & Nouwens 2018, p4) 
Overall, these trends suggest a heightened role for China in providing direct and indirect 
means to enhance security along the BRI, operating at an almost global level. To avoid 
parallel threat perceptions, China might in theory evolve into a net security provider as a 
shared good rather than a ‘security problem’ at the regional and global levels. Although this 
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may be possible to achieve with targeted partners such as Russia, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan, 
these enhanced operations have generated threat perceptions and an emerging security 
dilemma operating for NTS issues and how they are contained and controlled. We can see 
this most clearly when we turn back to the limits of Chinese and Japanese cooperation in 
these areas. 
China and Japan as NTS Partners and Competitors 
Japan, via its historical expansion into mainland Asia in the early and mid-twentieth, and its 
place as the primary US ally in Asia in the 21
st
 century, find itself positioned as a strategic 
competitor with China. This adversarial relationship seems to be deepening in spite of strong 
trade flows (China was Japan’s second largest trading partner in 2018) and past cycles of 
diplomacy aimed at improving relations. As we have already seen, both countries have been 
actively involved in anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, and both have opened support 
bases in Djibouti, alongside other countries (MoD 2018b; Melvin 2019). These Japanese and 
Chinese maritime efforts can be seen as mutual shadowing and matching of extended 
deployment capacities in the Indian Ocean, in contrast to more direct forms of strategic 
deterrence in the East China Sea (Layton 2019; Hughes 2009 & 2004).  
For both countries, NTS challenges has been an area where cooperation has been very active. 
Japan and China have both been subject to major natural disasters, and both have experienced 
major earthquakes that have led to mutual patterns of emergency relief, plus an active 
exchange of scientific information through government agencies (the China Earthquake 
Administration and the Japan Meteorological Agency) and several universities (Cui 2013). 
For example, China’s 2008 Wenchuan earthquake disaster led to large-scale government, 
NGO and public responses from Japan: 
Many people in China were touched by the fact that the support was obviously sincere and 
had been provided without delay. Given the historical distrust and animosity between China 
and Japan, the dedication and professionalism of the Japanese rescue and medical teams 
made a particularly positive impression. The story of Japanese help has become a significant 
factor in the improvement of the image of Japan in China. According to a survey taken shortly 
after the Wenchuan earthquake, 83.6% of Chinese liked Japan, a remarkable 73.6% increase 
compared to the previous survey. (Cui 2013, p876) 
Overall environmental has been seen as a useful area for cooperation and dialogue between 
China and Japan, even acting as a kind of ‘shock absorber’ during period of cyclic tension 
between the two states (Cui 2013, p882). 
However, strategic and tactical tensions have also been experienced in the midst of complex 
humanitarian disasters as well. Perhaps the clearest case of tensions over HADR can be seen 
during the response to the March 2011 Fukushima disaster which stretched Japanese and US 
humanitarian response mechanisms. These were closely observed by Russia and China, 
‘possibly allowing them to identify SDF skills and capabilities to balance against’ (Lin-
Greenberg 2018, p292). China did send a 15 member rescue team to the affected area, and 
offered immediate material aid such as fuel, tents and blankets, alongside aid mobilised by 
China’s Red Cross (Cui 2013). However, further aid such as deployment of its PLAN Peace 
Ark hospital ship and special robots designed to operate in nuclear incidents were declined 
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(Lin-Greenberg 2018). Two other important factors were engaged in relation to the 
Fukushima crisis. First, Japan was disturbed by close surveillance of its operations by both 
Russia and China (Lin-Greenberg 2018). Second, Japan officials used the short-comings it 
experienced in the disaster to argue for the subsequent acquisition of dual-use mobile assets 
including Osprey aircraft and amphibious vessels. This would thereafter raise concern in 
China: 
Because systems like airlift assets and amphibious ships can be used during both MOOTW 
and combat operations, Chinese officials and commentators have criticized Japan’s post-3/11 
acquisitions as evidence of Tokyo’s aggressive intentions. A Chinese Defense Ministry 
spokesperson condemned Japan’s 2013 decision to acquire RQ-4 reconnaissance aircraft 
[Global Hawk UAVs] and amphibious ships, arguing that Tokyo’s actions “us[ed] the pretext of 
safeguarding Japan’s own national security and regional peace for its military expansion.” In 
recent years, China has stepped up its own development of remotely piloted reconnaissance 
aircraft and has continued to modernize its fleet of amphibious warfare ships, suggesting it is 
balancing against Japan’s military expansion. (Lin-Greenberg 2018, p296, brackets added 
material). 
China has since expanded its development of UAVs and modernized its amphibious warship 
capacities, suggesting ongoing balancing against Japan’s military capacities. Recently this 
has included PRC’s commissioning of 5 Type-071 large landing ships and the building of a 
new Type-075 amphibious assault vessel, while UAVs, such as SULA30 reconnaissance and 
Sea Cavalry SD-40 drones, are being developed and increasingly acquired for surveillance, 
reconnaissance and limited strike roles (Hackett et al. 2019; Lin-Greenberg 2018). 
Conclusion: Inclusive Multilayered Security Rather than Pre-emption 
The well-known problem for NTS is that it reconstructs the field of possible ‘threats’, thereby 
expanding potentially inappropriate solutions derived from conflict experiences and military 
operations to developmental and environmental problems (Chiselli 2018). One noted example 
of this was the shift of Plan Colombia from its wider developmental, crop substitution and 
policing origins (as originally planned in the late 1990s) towards a ‘war on drugs’ model that 
ended up escalating regional violence, leading to an intensified ‘irrational war’ model that 
Colombia would take decades years to moderate (Richani 2005). Excluding the South China 
Sea and the East China Sea, where direct territorial claims are in conflict, competition in the 
Indian Ocean is indirect, concerned with the ongoing presence of naval forces, access to 
ports, and the relative power projection and soft power influence of India, Japan, China, the 
US, and to a lesser degree other states (Australia and Indonesia). In such a setting ‘even the 
most-benign military deployments can amplify mistrust and arms racing, suggesting that 
capabilities – rather than intentions – play a more significant role in driving competition 
between rivals” (Lin-Greenberg 2018, p283).  
 
Solutions to these problems are simple in theory but complex in application. They rest on two 
approaches: where force it is required this should function through UN or multilateral 
institutions, and where force is not required there should be a shift towards de-militarization 
of responses even when they viewed as security issues (Cui 2013). For example, a response 
to high levels of piracy requires responses requires armed, sea-going vessels to deter, destroy 
or capture raiding pirates, often moving beyond EEZs into open seas. Over the last two 
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decades, this has forced the creation of mixed international flotillas, engaging NATO, EU, 
and Indo-Pacific navies, as well as regional frameworks such as the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP). 
Through such frameworks, US, Japanese, Indian, Australian and Chinese naval forces 
(ReCAAP now has 20 member states) have become shared responders to pirate attacks, and 
do provide improved SLOC security, while the UN, the African Union and the EU have 
worked on reducing the land-based causes of piracy.  
However, individual, uncoordinated task forces operating in remote oceans can equally be 
seen as power projection demonstrations rather than net security providers. Even when they 
are designed to protect regional shipping, they still run the risk of being seen to wave the flag 
of national capacities. Instead, military forces should clearly distinguish and announce SLOC 
patrols operations versus other kinds of military exercises. Likewise, care needs to be taken to 
reduce reactive and competitive factors coming into play when framing MOOTW and HADR 
operations, with clear public diplomacy shaped to reduce cycles of follow-on competition 
(Lin-Greenberg 2018). Where possible, such operation should avoid deployment into 
sensitive regions and be used to build wider people-to-people relations, e.g. via the 
coordinated deployment of multinational civilian responders (Cui 2013). 
Where major military force is not needed, there is a need to rapidly de-militarize operations 
after the initial period of emergency deployment. In part this can be done by the handover of 
tasks to other government agencies as well as UN, civilian, NGO and aid groups (30,000 civil 
society groups are now registered or liaising with the UN at different levels, see Ha 2015). It 
also requires an improved flow from emergency and disaster response to aid, reconstruction, 
and then developmental phases (Ha 2015). Only the early part of these tasks can be 
undertaken by HADR or MOOTW responses, though cooperation is also run through 
multilateral frameworks such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) and ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA), with 
global preventive measures being developed through the United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (from 2015). 
De-militarization requires a widening of cooperation beyond the involved militaries to other 
agencies, and a deepening towards cooperation among non-state actors, NGOs, civil society 
and volunteer groups, thus enhancing people-to-people engagement (Cui 2013). In most 
cases, the aim should be to first demilitarize and where possible de-securitize responses as 
they come under effective international management. 
Traditionally, NTS and humanitarian operations were seen as areas where cooperation was 
more likely than competition, and soft power easy to accrue through constructive use of 
military assets. However, given the complex geopolitical and geo-economic contexts of the 
Indo-Pacific and divided reactions to the Belt and Road Initiative, these assumptions need 
further investigation (Lin-Greenberg 2018). India, Australia, the US and to some degree 
Japan have remained highly critical of the lack of transparency and multilateral accountability 
found in many BRI projects. Beyond specific concerns such as environmental standards and 
levels of debt for poor and small countries, there is also concern about the geopolitical 
leverage China gains by leading a project that might transform at least three continents 
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Ghiasy & Zhou 2017). In such a setting, even logical provisions against NTS threats along 
BRI corridors become two-edge swords, strengthening a web of security relationships in 
which China is the senior partner. Given the rising geopolitical tensions between the major 
powers of the Indo-Pacific, it is time for a calibrated review of the use of military diplomacy 
and HADR operation among competing states. 
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